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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown lack of robustness
for the vulnerability of their classification to small perturbations on the inputs.
This has led to safety concerns of applying DNNs to safety-critical domains.
Several verification approaches have been developed to automatically prove or
disprove safety properties of DNNs. However, these approaches suffer from ei-
ther the scalability problem, i.e., only small DNNs can be handled, or the preci-
sion problem, i.e., the obtained bounds are loose. This paper improves on a recent
proposal of analyzing DNNs through the classic abstract interpretation technique,
by a novel symbolic propagation technique. More specifically, the values of neu-
rons are represented symbolically and propagated forwardly from the input layer
to the output layer, on top of abstract domains. We show that our approach can
achieve significantly higher precision and thus can prove more properties than us-
ing only abstract domains. Moreover, we show that the bounds derived from our
approach on the hidden neurons, when applied to a state-of-the-art SMT based
verification tool, can improve its performance. We implement our approach into
a software tool and validate it over a few DNNs trained on benchmark datasets
such as MNIST, etc.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been broadly applied in various domains including
nature language processing [1], image classification [11], game playing [22], etc. The
performance of these DNNs, when measured with the prediction precision over a test
dataset, is comparable to, or even better than, that of manually crafted software. How-
ever, for safety critical applications, it is required that the DNNs are certified against
properties related to its safety. Unfortunately, DNNs have been found lack of robust-
ness. Specifically, [23] discovers that it is possible to add a small, or even imperceptible,
perturbation to a correctly classified input and make it misclassified. Such adversarial
examples have raised serious concerns on the safety of DNNs. Consider a self-driving
system controlled by a DNN. A failure on the recognization of a traffic light may lead
to serious consequence because human lives are at stake.
Algorithms used to find adversarial examples are based on either gradient descent,
see e.g., [23,2], or saliency maps, see e.g., [18], or evolutionary algorithm, see e.g.,
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[17], etc. Roughly speaking, these are heuristic search algorithms without the guaran-
tees to find the optimal values, i.e., the bound on the gap between an obtained value
and its ground truth is unknown. However, the certification of a DNN needs provable
guarantees. Thus, techniques based on formal verification have been developed. Up to
now, DNN verifications include constraint-solving [19,10,13,7,15,27,5], layer-by-layer
exhaustive search [9,26,25], global optimization [20], abstract interpretation [8], etc.
Abstract interpretation is a theory of sound approximation of the semantics of programs
[3], the basic idea of which is to use an abstract domain to over-approximate the com-
putation on inputs. In [8], this idea has been developed for verifying DNNs. However,
abstract interpretation can be imprecise, due to the non-linearity in DNNs.
The first contribution of this paper is to propose a novel symbolic propagation tech-
nique to enhance the precision of abstract interpretation based DNN verification. For
every neuron, we symbolically represent, with an expression, how its value can be de-
termined by the values of some neurons in previous layers. By both illustrative examples
and experimental results, we show that, comparing with using only abstract domains,
our new approach can find significantly tighter constraints over the neurons. Because
abstract interpretation is a sound approximation, with tighter constraints, we may prove
properties that cannot be proven by using only abstract domains. For example, we may
prove a greater lower bound on the robustness of the DNNs.
Another contribution of this paper is to apply the value bounds derived from our ap-
proach on hidden neurons to improve the performance of a state-of-the-art SMT based
DNN verifier Reluplux [10].
Finally, we implement our approach into a software tool5 and validate it with a few
DNNs trained on benchmark datasets such as MNIST, etc.
2 Preliminaries
We recall some basic notions on deep neural networks and abstract interpretation. For
a vector x¯ ∈ Rn, we use xi to denote its i-th entry. For a metrix W ∈ Rm×n, Wi,j
denotes the entry in its i-th row and j-th column.
2.1 Deep neural networks
We work with deep feedforward neural networks, or DNNs, which can be represented
as a function f : Rm → Rn, mapping an input x¯ ∈ Rm to its output y¯ = f(x) ∈
Rn. A DNN has in its structure a sequence of layers, including an input layer at the
beginning, followed by several hidden layers, and an output layer in the end. Basically
the output of a layer is the input of the next layer. The DNN f is the composition of the
transformations between layers. Between two layers, typically a linear transformation
followed by a non-linear activation function is performed. One of the most commonly
used activation function is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function, defined
as
ReLU(x) = max(x, 0)
5 Available via Dropbox: https://goo.gl/wLpQWj
for x ∈ R and ReLU(x¯) = (ReLU(x1), . . . ,ReLU(xn)) for x¯ ∈ Rn. We introduce
the following three types of layers.
A fully connected layer is a function FCW,b¯ : Rm → Rn, such that W ∈ Rm×n,
b¯ ∈ Rn, and
FCW,b¯(x¯) = ReLU(Wx¯+ b¯).
A convolutional layer F p,q = (F p,q1 , . . . , F
p,q
t ) has a set of t filters such that
p ≤ m and q ≤ n. Each filter F p,ql : Rm×n×r → R(m−p+1)×(n−q+1), parameterised
over W ∈ Rp×q×r and b ∈ R, has its (i, j)-th entry F p,ql (x¯)i,j as
ReLU
 p∑
i′=1
q∑
j′=1
r∑
k′=1
Wi′,j′,k′xi+i′−1,j+j′−1,k′ + b
 .
A max pooling layer takes as an input a three dimensional vector x¯ ∈ Rm×n×r.
With two parameters p and q which dividesm and n respectively, we define MaxPoolp,q(x¯)i,j,k
as
max{xi′,j′,k | p(i− 1) < i′ ≤ pi, q(i− 1) < j′ ≤ qi}.
Let DNN f have N layers, each of which has mk neurons, for 0 ≤ k < N . There-
fore, m0 = m and mN−1 = n.
2.2 Abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a theory of sound approximation of the semantics of com-
puter programs, which has been used in static analysis to verify properties of a program
without actually running it. In the following, we describe its adaptation to work with
DNNs.
Generally, on the input layer, we have a concrete domain C, which includes a set
of inputs X as one of its elements. To enable an efficient computation, we choose an
abstract domainA to infer the relation of variables in C. We assume that there is a partial
order ≤ on C as well as A, which in our settings is the subset relation ⊆.
Definition 2.1. A pair of functions α : C → A and γ : A → C is a Galois connection,
if for any a ∈ A and c ∈ C, we have α(c) ≤ a⇔ c ≤ γ(a).
Intuitively, a Galois connection (α, γ) expresses abstraction and concretization relations
between domains, respectively. Note that, a ∈ A is a sound abstraction of c ∈ C if and
only if c ≤ γ(a).
In abstract interpretation, it is important to choose a suitable abstract domain be-
cause it determines the efficiency and precision of the abstract interpretation. In prac-
tice, we use a certain type of constraints to represent the abstract elements. Geometri-
cally, a certain type of constraints correspond to a special shape. E.g., the conjunction
of a set of arbitrary linear constraints correspond to a polyhedron. Abstract domains
that fit for verifying DNN include Intervals, Zonotopes, and Polyhedra.
– Interval. An interval I contains bound constraints in the form of a ≤ xi ≤ b. The
conjunction of bound constraints express a box in the Euclid space, and thus it is
also named the Box abstract domain.
– Zonotope. A zonotopeZ consists of constraints in the form of zi = ai+
∑m
j=1 bijj ,
where ai, bij are real constants and j ∈ [lj , uj ]. The conjunction of these con-
straints express a center-symmetric polyhedra in the Euclid space.
– Polyhedra. A Polyhedron P has constraints in the form of linear inequalities, i.e.∑n
i=1 aixi ≤ b and it gives a closed convex polyhedron in the Euclid space.
Example 2.2. Let x¯ ∈ R2, and the range of x¯ be X = {(1, 0), (0, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1)}.
With Interval, we can abstract the inputs X as [0, 2] × [0, 2], and with Zonotope, X
can be abstracted as
{
x1 = 1− 121 − 123, x2 = 1 + 121 + 122
}
. where 1, 2, 3 ∈
[−1, 1]. With Polyhedra, X can be abstracted as {x2 ≤ 2, x2 ≤ −x1 + 3, x2 ≥
x1 − 1, x2 ≥ −2x1 + 2}.
3 Symbolic Propagation for Abstract Interpretation based DNN
Verification
In this section, we first describe how to use abstract interpretation to verify DNNs. Then
we present a symbolic propagation method to enhance its precision.
3.1 Abstract interpretation based DNN verification
The DNN verification problem The problem of verifying DNNs can be stated for-
mally as follows.
Definition 3.1. Given a function f : Rm → Rn which expresses a DNN, a domain of
the inputs X0 ⊆ Rm, and a property C ⊆ Rn, it is to determine whether f(X0) ⊆ C
holds, where f(X0) = {f(x¯) | x¯ ∈ X0}.
We use ‖x¯ − x¯0‖p with p ∈ [1,∞] to denote the Lp norm distance between two
vectors x¯ and x¯0. In this paper, we use L∞ norm defined as follows.
‖x¯‖∞ = max
1≤i≤n
|xi|.
Note that, given an input x¯0 ∈ Rm and a perturbation tolerance δ > 0, the prob-
lem of verifying local robustness can be obtained by letting X0 be B(x¯0, δ) := {x¯ |
‖x¯ − x¯0‖p ≤ δ} and C be CL := {y¯ ∈ Rn | arg max1≤i≤n yi = L}, where
L = arg max1≤i≤n f(x¯0)i is the label of x¯0.
Verifying DNNs via abstract interpretation Under the framework of abstract inter-
pretation, to conduct verification of DNNs, we first need to choose an abstract domain
A. Then we represent the set of inputs of a DNN as an abstract element (value) X]0 in
A. After that, we pass it through the DNN layers by applying abstract transformers of
the abstract domain. Recall that N is the number of layers in a DNN and mk is the
number of nodes in the k-th layer. Let fk (where 1 ≤ k < N ) be the layer function
mapping from Rmk−1 to Rmk . We can lift fk to Tfk : P(Rm) → P(Rmk) such that
Tfk(X) = {fk(x¯) | x¯ ∈ X}.
Definition 3.2. An abstract transformer T ]fk is a function mapping an abstract element
X]k−1 in the abstract domain A to another abstract element X]k. Moreover, T ]fk is
sound if Tfk ◦ γ ⊆ γ ◦ T ]fk .
Intuitively, a sound abstract transformer T ]fk maintains a sound relation between the
abstract post-state and the abstract pre-state of a transformer in DNN (such as linear
transformation, ReLU operation, etc.).
LetXk = fk(...(f1(X0))) be the exact set of resulting vectors in Rmk (i.e., the k-th
layer) computed over the concrete inputs X0, and X]k = Tfk
](...(Tf1
](X]0))) be the
corresponding abstract value of the k-th layer when using an abstract domain A. Note
that X0 ⊆ γ(X]0). We have the following conclusion.
Proposition 1 If Xk−1 ⊆ γ(X]k−1), then we have Xk ⊆ γ(X]k) = γ ◦ T ]fk(X]k−1).
Therefore, when performing abstract interpretation over the transformations in a
DNN, the abstract pre-state X]k−1 is transformed into abstract post-state X]k by ap-
plying the abstract transformer T ]fk which is built on top of an abstract domain. This
procedure starts from k = 1 and continues until reaching the output layer (and getting
X]N−1). Finally, we use X]N−1 to check the property C as follows:
γ(X]N−1) ⊆ C. (1)
The following theorem states that this verification procedure based on abstract in-
terpretation is sound for the DNN verification problem.
Theorem 3.3. If Equation (1) holds, then f(X0) ⊆ C.
It’s not hard to see that the other direction does not necessarily hold due to the
potential incompleteness caused by the over-approximation made in both the abstract
elements and the abstract transformers T ]fk in an abstract domain.
Example 3.4. Let x¯, y¯, z¯ ∈ R2. Suppose that x¯ takes the value given in Example 1, and
we have the following transformations: y¯ =
(
1 2
1 −1
)
x¯ and z¯ =
(
1 1
−1 1
)
y¯. To cope
with the above transformations, when using the Interval abstract domain, the resulting
range of z¯ is ([−2, 8] [−2, 8])T , while using the Zonotope abstract domain, we get the
resulting zonotope after the transformations as follows:{
z1 = 3− 1
2
1 +
1
2
2 − 3, z2 = −3− 3
2
1 − 3
2
2
}
.
The abstract value computed via abstract interpretation can be directly used to verify
properties. Take the local robustness property, which expresses an invariance on the
classification of f over a region B(x¯0, δ), as an example. Let li(x¯) be the confidence
of x¯ being labeled as i, and l(x¯) = argmaxili(x¯) be the label. It has been shown in
[23,21] that DNNs are Lipschitz continuous. Therefore, when δ is small, we have that
|li(x¯)− li(x¯0)| is also small for all labels i. That is, if li(x¯0) is significantly greater than
lj(x¯0) for j 6= i, it is highly likely that li(x¯) is also significantly greater than lj(x¯). It
is not hard to see that the more precise the relations among li(x¯0), li(x¯), lj(x¯0), lj(x¯)
computed via abstract interpretation, the more likely we can prove the robustness. Based
on this reason, this paper aims to derive techniques to enhance the precision of abstract
interpretation such that it can prove some more properties that cannot be proven by the
original abstract interpretation.
3.2 Symbolic propagation for DNN verification
Symbolic propagation can ensure soundness while providing more precise results. In
[24], a technique called symbolic interval propagation is present and we expand it to
our abstraction interpretation framework so that it works on all abstract domains. First,
we use the following example to show that using only abstract transformations in an
abstract domain may lead to precision loss, while using symbolic propagation could
enhance the precision.
Example 3.5. Assume that we have a two-dimensional input (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]
and a few transformations y1 := x1 + x2, y2 := x1 − x2, and z := y1 + y2. Suppose
we use the Interval abstract domain to analyze the transformations.
– When using only the Interval abstract domain, we have y1 ∈ [0, 2], y2 ∈ [−1, 1],
and thus z ∈ [−1, 3] (i.e., [0, 2] + [−1, 1]).
– By symbolic propagation, we record y1 = x1 +x2 and y2 = x1−x2 on the neurons
y1 and y2 respectively, and then get z = 2x1 ∈ [0, 2]. This result is more precise
than that given by using only the Interval abstract domain.
Non-relational (e.g., intervals) or weakly-relational abstract domains (e.g., zones,
octagons, zonotopes, etc.) [14] can not precisely encode the linear transformations (in
the form of y := Σki=1wixi + b) in a DNN. Moreover, it is often the case for weakly-
relational abstract domains that the composition of the optimal abstract transformers of
individual statements in a sequence does not result in the optimal abstract transformer
for the whole sequence, which has been shown in Example 3 when using only the
interval abstract domain. A choice to precisely handle general linear transformations is
to use the Polyhedra abstract domain which uses a conjunction of linear constraints as
domain representation. However, the Polyhedra domain has the worst-case exponential
space and time complexity when handling the ReLU operation (via the join operation in
the abstract domain). As a consequence, DNN verification with the Polyhedra domain
is impractical for large scale DNNs, which has been also confirmed in [8].
In this paper, we leverage symbolic propagation technique to enhance the preci-
sion for abstract interpretation based DNN verification. The insight behind is that linear
transformations account for a large portion of the transformations in a DNN. Further-
more, when verifying properties such as robustness, the activation of a neuron can often
be deterministic for inputs around an input with small perturbation. Hence, there should
be a large number of linear equality relations that can be derived from the composition
of a sequence of linear transformations via symbolic propagation. And we can use such
linear equality relations to improve the precision of the results given by abstract do-
mains. In Section 6, our experimental results confirm that, when the perturbation toler-
ance δ is small, there is a significant proportion of neurons whose ReLU activations are
consistent.
First, given X0, a ReLU neuron y := ReLU(Σki=1wixi +b) can be classified into
one of the following 3 categories (according to its range information): (1) definitely-
activated, if the range of Σki=1wixi + b is a subset of [0,∞), (2) definitely-deactivated,
if the range of Σki=1wixi + b is a subset of (−∞, 0], and (3) uncertain, otherwise.
Now we detail our symbolic propagation technique. We first introduce a symbolic
variable si for each node i in the input layer, to denote the initial value of that node.
For a ReLU neuron d := ReLU(Σki=1wici + b) where ci is a symbolic variable, we
make use of the resulting abstract value of abstract domain at this node to determine
whether the value of input of this node is definitely greater than 0 or definitely less than
0. If it is a definitely-activated neuron, we record for this neuron the linear combination
Σki=1wici + b as its symbolic representation (i.e., the value of symbolic propagation).
If it is a definitely-deactivated neuron, we record for this neuron the value 0 as its sym-
bolic representation. Otherwise, we cannot have a linear combination as the symbolic
representation and thus a fresh symbolic variable sd is introduced to denote the output
of this ReLU neuron. We also record the bounds for sd, such that the lower bound for
sd is set to 0 (since the output of a ReLU neuron is always non-negative) and the upper
bound keeps the one obtained by abstract interpretation.
To formalize the algorithm for ReLU node, we first define the abstract states in the
analysis and three transfer functions for linear assignments, condition tests and joins re-
spectively. An abstract state in our analysis is composed of an abstract element for a nu-
meric domain (e.g., Box) n# ∈ N#, a set of free symbolic variablesC (those not equal
to any linear expressions), a set of constrained symbolic variables S (those equal to a
certain linear expression), and a map from constrained symbolic variables to linear ex-
pressions ξ ::= S⇒ {∑ni=1 aixi+ b | xi ∈ C}. Note that we only allow free variables
in the linear expressions in ξ. In the beginning, all input variables are taken as free sym-
bolic variables. In Algorithm 1, we show the transfer functions for linear assignments
[y :=
∑n
i=1 aixi + b]
# which over-approximates the behaviors of y :=
∑n
i=1 aixi + b.
If n > 0 (i.e., the right value expression is not a constant), variable y is added to the
constrained variable set S. All constrained variables in expr =
∑n
i=1 aixi + b is re-
placed by their corresponding expressions in ξ, and the map from y to the new expr is
recorded in ξ. Abstract numeric element n# is updated by the transfer function for as-
signments in the numeric domain [y := expr]#
N#
. If n ≤ 0, the right-value expression
is a constant, then y is added to C, and is removed from S and ξ.
The abstract transfer function for condition test is defined as [expr ≤ 0]#(n#,C,S, ξ) ::=
([expr ≤ 0]#
N#
(n#),C,S, ξ), which only updates the abstract element n# by the
transfer function in the numeric domain N#.
The join algorithm in our analysis is defined in Algorithm 2. Only the constrained
variables arising in both input Ss and are with the same corresponding linear expres-
sions are taken as constrained variables. The abstract element in the result is obtained
by applying the join operator in the numeric domain unionsqN# .
The transfer function for a ReLU node is defined as
[y := ReLU(
k∑
i=1
wixi + b)]
#(n#,C,S, ξ) ::= join([y > 0]#ψ, [y := 0]#([y < 0]#)ψ),
where ψ = [y :=
∑n
i=1 aixi + b]
#(n#,C,S, ξ).
Algorithm 1: Transfer function for linear assignments [y :=
∑n
i=1 aixi + b]
#
Input: abstract numeric element n# ∈ N#, free variables C, constrained variables S,
symbolic map ξ
1 expr←∑ni=1 aixi + b
2 When the right value expression just contains a constant
3 if n > 0 then
4 for i ∈ [1, n] do
5 if xi ∈ S then
6 expr = expr|xi←ξ(xi)
7 end
8 end
9 ξ = ξ ∪ {y 7→ expr}
10 S = S ∪ {y}
11 C = C/{y}
12 n# = [y := expr]#
N#
13 else
14 ξ = ξ/(y 7→ ∗)
15 C = C ∪ {y}
16 S = C/{y}
17 n# = [y := expr]#
N#
18 end
19 end
20 return (n#,C,S, ξ)
Algorithm 2: Join algorithm join
Input: (n#0 ,C0,S0, ξ0) and (n
#
1 ,C1,S1, ξ1)
1 n# = n#0 unionsqN# n#1
2 ξ = ξ0 ∩ ξ1
3 S = {x | ∃expr, x→ expr ∈ ξ}
4 C = C0 ∪ (S0/S)
5 return (n#,C,S, ξ)
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Fig. 1. An illustrative example of symbolic propagation
For a max pooling node d := max1≤i≤k ci, if there exists some cj whose lower
bound is larger than the upper bound of ci for all i 6= j, we set cj as the symbolic
representation for d. Otherwise, we introduce a fresh symbolic variable sd for d and
record its bounds wherein its lower (upper) bound is the maximum of the lower (upper)
bounds of ci’s. Note that the lower (upper) bound of each ci can be derived from the
abstract value for this neuron given by abstract domain.
The algorithm for max-pooling layer can be defined with the three aforementioned
transfer functions as follows:
join(φ1, join(φ2, . . . , join(φk−1, φk))),
where φi = [d := ci]#[ci ≥ c1]#, . . . [ci ≥ ck]#(n#,C,S, ξ)
Example 3.6. For the DNN shown in Figure 1(a), there are two input nodes denoted by
symbolic variables x and y, two hidden nodes, and one output node. The initial ranges
of the input symbolic variables x and y are given, i.e., [4, 6] and [3, 4] respectively. The
weights are labeled on the edges. It is not hard to see that, when using the Interval
abstract domain, (the inputs of) the two hidden nodes have bounds [17, 24] and [0, 3] re-
spectively. For the hidden node with [17, 24], we know that this ReLU node is definitely
activated, and thus we use symbolic propagation to get a symbolic expression 2x+ 3y
to symbolically represent the output value of this node. Similarly, for the hidden node
with [0, 3], we get a symbolic expression x − y. Then for the output node, symbolic
propagation results in x+ 4y, which implies that the output range of the whole DNN is
[16, 22]. If we use only the Interval abstract domain without symbolic propagation, we
will get the output range [14, 24], which is less precise than [16, 22].
For the DNN shown in Figure 1(b), we change the initial range of the input vari-
able y to be [4.5, 5]. For the hidden ReLU node with [−1, 1.5], it is neither definitely
activated nor definitely deactivated, and thus we introduce a fresh symbolic variable
s to denote the output of this node, and set its bound to [0, 1.5]. For the output node,
symbolic propagation results in 2x+ 3y− s, which implies that the output range of the
whole DNN is [20, 27].
For a definitely-activated neuron, we utilize its symbolic representation to enhance
the precision of abstract domains. We add the linear constraint d == Σki=1wici+b into
the abstract value at (the input of) this node, via the meet operation (which is used to
deal with conditional test in a program) in the abstract domain [3]. If the precision of the
abstract value for the current neuron is improved, we may find more definitely-activated
neurons in the subsequent layers. In other words, the analysis based on abstract domain
and our symbolic propagation mutually improves the precision of each other on-the-fly.
After obtaining symbolic representation for all the neurons in a layer k, the compu-
tation proceeds to layer k+1. The computation terminates after completing the compu-
tation for the output layer. All symbolic representations in the output layer are evaluated
to obtain value bounds.
The following theorem shows some results on precision of our symbolic propaga-
tion technique.
Theorem 3.7. (1) For an FNN f : Rm → Rn and a box region X ⊆ Rm, the Box
abstract domain with symbolic propagation can give a more precise abstraction for
f(X) than the Zonotope abstract domain without symbolic propagation.
(2) For an FNN f : Rm → Rn and a box region X ⊆ Rm, the Box abstract
domain with symbolic propagation and the Zonotope abstract domain with symbolic
propagation gives the same abstraction for f(X).
(3) There exists a CNN g : Rm → Rn and a box region X ⊆ Rm s.t. the Zonotope
abstract domain with symbolic propagation give a strictly more precise abstraction for
g(X) than the Box abstract domain with symbolic propagation.
Proof. (1) It suffices to consider the ReLU nodes because Neither Box with symbolic
propagation nor Zonotope without symbolic propagation does not lose precision in lin-
ear transformations. Let X ′ be a zonotope region, and we consider ReLU(X ′). First
we consider Box with symbolic propagation. For a definitely activated node yi, it will
keep its symbolic representation. For a definitely deactivated node yi, its symbolic rep-
resentation is yi = 0. For an uncertain node yi, we will build a new symbol for it
and record its range. The abstraction of y¯ consists of these symbol representations ,
and it represents the cylinder with the precise zonotope of the activated dimensions
and the deactivated dimensions as the base and the uncertain dimensions along with
their ranges as the cylindrical surface. Now we consider Zonotope. Compared with Box
with symbolic propagation, Zonotope has the same precision on definitely activated and
deactivated nodes. However, when Zonotope deals with uncertain nodes, it has a join
operation and destroys all the relations among them, so it loses more precision than Box
with symbolic propagation.
(2) Box or Zonotope with symbolic propagation does not lose precision in linear
transformations from the algorithm of symbolic propagation and the linear transforma-
tions for Zonotope, so it suffices to show that Zonotope with symbolic propagation does
not give a more precise abstraction on ReLU nodes. For the activated and deactivated
nodes, obviously they have the same precise abstraction. For the uncertain nodes, as (1)
shows, zonotope cannot preserve relations for these nodes, and it behaves as Box does.
(3) Let the zonotope X ′ = {x1 = 2 + 1 + 2, x2 = 2 + 1− 2 | 1, 2 ∈ [−1, 1]}
and the max pooling node y = max{x1, x2}. Obviously X ′ can be obtained through a
linear transformation on some box region X . With Box with symbolic propagation, the
abstraction of y is [0, 4], while Zonotope with symbolic propagation gives the abstrac-
tion is [1, 4].
Thm 3.7 gives us some insights: Symbolic propagation technique has a very strong
power (even stronger than Zonotope) in dealing with ReLU nodes, while Zonotope
gives a more precise abstraction on max pooling nodes. It also provides a useful in-
struction: When we work with FNNs with the input range being an interval, we should
use Interval with symbolic propagation rather than Zonotope with symbolic propaga-
tion since it does not improve the precision but takes more time. Results in Thm 3.7
will also be illustrated in our experiments.
4 Abstract Interpretation as an Accelerator for SMT based DNN
Verification
In this section we briefly recall DNN verification based on SMT solvers, and then de-
scribe how to utilize the results by abstract interpretation with our symbolic propagation
to improve its performance.
4.1 SMT based DNN verification
In [10,7], two SMT solvers Reluplex and Planet were presented to verify DNNs. Typ-
ically an SMT solver combines a SAT solver with specialized decision procedures for
other theories. The verification of DNNs uses linear arithmetic over real numbers, in
which an atom may have the form of
∑n
i=1 aixi ≤ b, where ai and b are real numbers.
Both Reluplex and Planet use the DPLL algorithm to split cases and rule out conflict
clauses. They are different in dealing with the intersection. For Reluplex, it inherits
rules from the Simplex algorithm and adds a few rules dedicated to ReLU operation.
Through the classical pivot operation, it searches for a solution to the linear constraints,
and then apply the rules for ReLU to ensure the ReLU relation for every node. Differ-
ently, Planet uses linear approximation to over-approximate the DNN, and manage the
conditions of ReLU and max pooling nodes with logic formulas.
4.2 Abstract interpretation with symbolic propagation as an accelerator
SMT-based DNN verification approaches are often not efficient, e.g., relying on case
splitting for ReLU operation. In the worst case, case splitting is needed for each ReLU
operation in a DNN. In particular, when analyzing large-scale DNNs, SMT-based DNN
verification approaches may suffer from the scalability problem and account time out,
which is also confirmed experimentally in [8].
In this paper, we utilize the results of abstract interpretation (with symbolic prop-
agation) to accelerate SMT-based DNN verification approaches. More specifically, we
use the bound information of each ReLU node (obtained by abstract interpretation) to
reduce the number of case-splitting, and thus accelerate SMT-based DNN verification.
For example, on a neuron d := ReLU(
∑k
i=1 wici + b), if we know that this node is a
definitely-activated node according to the bounds given by abstract interpretation, we
only consider the case d :=
∑k
i=1 wici+ b and thus no split is applied. We remark that,
this does not compromise the precision of SMT-based DNN verification while improv-
ing their efficiency.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the soundness guarantee of our approach. Soundness is a
very desirable property of formal verification.
Abstract interpretation is known for its soundness guarantee for analysis and verifi-
cation [14], since it conducts over-approximation to enclose all the possible behaviors
of the original system. Computing over-approximations for a DNN is thus our sound-
ness guarantee in this paper. As shown in Theorem 3.3, if the results of abstract inter-
pretation show that the property C holds (i.e., γ(X]N ) ⊆ C in Equation 1), then the
property also holds for the set of actual executions of the DNN (i.e., f(X0) ⊆ C). If
the results of abstract interpretation can not prove that the property C holds, however,
the verification is inconclusive. In this case, the results of the chosen abstract domain
are not precise enough to prove the property, and thus more powerful abstract domains
are needed. Moreover, our symbolic propagation also preserves soundness, since it uses
symbolic substitution to compute the composition of linear transformations.
On the other hand, many existing DNN verification tools do not guarantee sound-
ness. For example, Reluplex [10] (using GLPK), Planet [7] (using GLPK), and Sher-
lock [4] (using Gurobi) all rely on the floating point implementation of linear program-
ming solvers, which is unsound. Actually, most state-of-the-art linear programming
solvers use floating-point arithmetic and only give approximate solutions which may
not be the actual optimum solution or may even lie outside the feasible space [16]. It
may happen that a linear programming solver implemented via floating point arithmetic
wrongly claims that a feasible linear system is infeasible or the other way round. In fact,
[4] reports several false positive results in Reluplex, and mentions that this comes from
unsound floating point implementation.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We present the design and results of our experiment.
6.1 Experimental setup
Dataset and DNNs We use the MNIST dataset [12], which contains 60, 000 28 × 28
grayscale handwritten digits. On MNIST, we train seven FNNs (i.e., DNNs with only
fully-connected layers), and one CNN (i.e., DNNs with fully-connected, convolutional,
and max-pooling layers). The seven FNNs are of the size 3×20, 6×20, 3×50, 3×100,
6 × 100, and 9 × 200, where m × n refers to m hidden layers with n neurons in each
hidden layer. The CNN consists of 2 convolutional, 1 max pooling, 2 convolutional, 1
max-pooling, and 3 fully connected layers in sequence.
Properties. We consider the local robustness property with respect to the L∞-norm.
Formally, for networks on MNIST we set the input region as
Sx¯,δ = {x¯′ ∈ Rm | ∀i.1− δ ≤ xi ≤ x′i ≤ 1 ∨ xi = x′i}.
In the experiments for MNIST, the optional robustness bound δ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.6}.
Experiments are conducted on an openSUSE Leap 15.0 machine with Intel i7 CPU@3.60GHz
and 16GB memory.
Box Zono SymBox SymZono Planet
FNN1 -24.63 17.80 -13.10 5.526 -6.771 -0.502 -6.771 -0.502 -5.679 -2.118
FNN2 -116.3 116.4 -90.07 89.53 -12.81 2.418 -12.81 2.418 -6.675 -4.304
FNN3 -46.99 31.51 -32.15 11.62 -13.84 -5.626 -13.84 -5.626 -11.73 -8.411
FNN4 -46.24 47.34 -28.12 24.01 -10.63 1.753 -10.63 1.753 -5.636 -3.630
FNN5 -1200 1144 -932.7 887.0 -386.3 365.5 -386.3 365.5 -14.46 -1.434
FNN6 -3669 4052 -2805 3096 -1035 1149 -1035 1149 -111.5 121.1
FNN7 -206814 231106 -189630 211903 -70992 79330 -70992 79330 TIMEOUT
CNN -527.2 463.2 -205.8 167.0 -254.3 213.4 -94.69 64.93 TIMEOUT
Box Zono SymBox SymZono Planet
FNN1 11.168 0.2 13.482 0.5 12.935 0.6 17.144 0.6 20.179 0.6
FNN2 12.559 0 16.636 0.2 15.075 0.5 22.333 0.5 35.84 0.6
FNN3 12.699 0.2 18.748 0.3 19.042 0.6 28.128 0.6 76.106 0.6
FNN4 15.583 0.1 29.495 0.3 37.716 0.6 56.47 0.6 351.139 0.6
FNN5 28.963 0 81.49 0.2 90.268 0.4 154.222 0.4 1297.485 0.6
FNN6 62.766 0 398.565 0.1 323.328 0.3 650.629 0.3 15823.208 0.3
FNN7 111.955 0 1674.465 0 642.978 0.3 1524.975 0.3 TIMEOUT
CNN 2340.828 0 6717.57 0.2 5124.681 0.2 8584.555 0.3 TIMEOUT
(a) (b)
Box Zono SymBox SymZono Planet
FNN1(60) 57 44 34 59 52 38 59 53 44 59 53 44 59 56 55
FNN2(120) 103 59 38 118 109 66 118 113 107 118 113 107 119 114 110
FNN3(150) 136 93 66 141 127 85 143 133 110 143 133 110 146 142 135
FNN4(300) 250 144 105 294 209 130 295 254 182 295 254 182 296 276 254
FNN5(600) 289 160 106 513 200 125 589 510 236 589 510 236 593 558 493
FNN6(1200) 472 247 181 782 339 195 1176 790 250 1176 790 250 1189 1089 772
FNN7(1800) 469 271 177 770 350 200 1773 741 263 1773 741 263 TIMEOUT
CNN(12412) 12226 11788 11280 12371 12119 11786 12373 12094 11659 12376 12193 11877 TIMEOUT
(c)
Fig. 2. Experimental results: (a) The lower and upper bounds of the 8-th entry in the output layer
(corresponding to the classification of the number 7) with the robustness bound δ = 0.6, and
the fixed input Picture 1955; (b) The time (in second) and the maximum robustness bound δ
which can be verified through the abstract interpretation technique and the planet bound, with
optional δ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6}, and the fixed input Picture 2090; (c) The number of
hidden ReLU neurons whose behavior can be decided with the bounds our abstract interpretation
technique and Planet provide with optional robustness bound δ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.6}, and the fixed
input Picture 767.
6.2 Experimental Results
We compare five approaches: Box, Zono, SymBox, SymZono, and Planet. Box and
Zono are baseline approaches of abstract interpretation with abstract domain as Interval
and Zonotope, respectively. SymBox and SymZone are our enhanced abstract interpre-
tation with symbolic propagation, for abstract domain as Interval and Zonotope, respec-
tively. Planet serves as the benchmark verification approach (for its ability to compute
bounds).
Improvement on Bounds To see the improvement on bounds, we fix an input x¯ and a
tolerance δ, and use the above five approaches to generate bounds for a given output
label. Figure 3(a) reports the results on an input x¯ (No. 1955 in the MNIST training
dataset) and a tolerance δ = 0.6. In all our experiments, we set TIMEOUT as one hour
for a single run with a DNN, an input, and a tolerance δ. In Figure 3(a), every entry
contains two numbers, for the lower and upper bound of the 8-th label, respectively. We
can see that, in general, SymBox and SymZono can achieve much better bounds than
Box and Zono do. These bounds are close to Planet has, except for FNN5 and FNN6.
On the other hand, while SymBox and SymZone can still return in a reasonable time,
Planet cannot return in a hour for FNN7 and CNN, which have 1800 and 12412 hidden
neurons, respectively. Results in Thm 3.7 are all illustrated here.
Greater Verifiable Robustness Bounds Figure 3(b) shows the results of using the ob-
tained bounds to do robustness verification. We consider a few thresholds for robustness
tolerance, i.e., {0.1, 0.4, 0.6}, and find that SymBox and SymZono can achieve much
greater bounds than Box and Zono do, and moreover their bounds are the same as or
close to what Planet can do.
Proportion of Activated/Deactivated ReLU Nodes Figure 3(c) reports the number of
hidden neurons whose ReLU behaviour (i.e., activated or deactivated) has been consis-
tent within the tolerance δ. Comparing with Box and Zono, our SymBox and SymZono
can confirm the ReLU behaviour with a much higher percentage.
Faster Verification To evaluate the benefits of tighter value bounds for SMT based tools,
we give the bounds by abstract interpretation (on Box domain with symbolic propaga-
tion) to Reluplex [10] and observe the performance difference. The results are shown in
Table 1. Each cell shows the satisfiability (i.e., SAT if an adversarial example is found)
or the running time without or with given bounds. The experiments are conducted on
different δ values [10] and a fixed network (nnet1 1) and 5 fixed points (Point 1 to 5
in [10]). The time our technique spent on deriving the bounds are all less than 1 sec-
ond. Table 1 shows that tighter initial bounds bring significant benefits to Reluplex with
an overall ( 15076 − 132992 )/ 132992 = 549.43% speedup (9.16 hours compared to 1.41
hours). However, it should be noted that, on one specific case (i.e., δ = 0.1 at Point 1),
the tighter initial bounds slow Reluplex, which means that the speedup is not guaranteed
on all cases.
δ = 0.1 δ = 0.075 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.025 δ = 0.01 Total
Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time Time
Point 1
Reluplex SAT 39 SAT 123 SAT 14 UNSAT 638 UNSAT 64 879
Reluplex + ABS SAT 45 SAT 36 SAT 14 UNSAT 237 UNSAT 36 368
Point 2
Reluplex UNSAT 6513 UNSAT 1559 UNSAT 319 UNSAT 49 UNSAT 11 8451
Reluplex + ABS UNSAT 141 UNSAT 156 UNSAT 75 UNSAT 40 UNSAT 0 412
Point 3
Reluplex UNSAT 1013 UNSAT 422 UNSAT 95 UNSAT 79 UNSAT 6 1615
Reluplex + ABS UNSAT 44 UNSAT 71 UNSAT 0 UNSAT 0 UNSAT 0 115
Point 4
Reluplex SAT 3 SAT 5 SAT 1236 UNSAT 579 UNSAT 8 1831
Reluplex + ABS SAT 3 SAT 7 UNSAT 442 UNSAT 31 UNSAT 0 483
Point 5
Reluplex UNSAT 14301 UNSAT 4248 UNSAT 1392 UNSAT 269 UNSAT 6 20216
Reluplex + ABS UNSAT 2002 UNSAT 1402 UNSAT 231 UNSAT 63 UNSAT 0 3698
Table 1. The satisfiability on given δ, and the times (in second) with and without bounds gener-
ated by abstract interpretation with symbolic propagation on the BOX domain.
7 Related Work
Verification of neural networks can be traced back to [19], where the network is en-
coded after approximating every sigmoid activation function with a set of piecewise
linear constraints and then solved with an SMT solver. It works with a network of 6
hidden nodes. More recently, by considering DNNs with ReLU activation functions,
the verification approaches include constraint-solving [10,13,7,15], layer-by-layer ex-
haustive search [9,26], global optimisation [20], abstract interpretation [8], etc. More
specifically, [10] presents an SMT solver Reluplex to verify properties on DNNs with
fully-connected layers. [7] presents another SMT solver Planet which combines linear
approximation and interval arithmetic to work with fully connected and max pooling
layers. Methods based on SMT solvers do not scale well, e.g., Reluplex can only work
with DNNs with about a few hidden neurons.
Besides the verification problem, research has been conducted on the output range
problem. In [4], Sherlock, an algorithm based on local and global search and mixed
integer linear programming (MILP), is put forward to calculate the output range of a
given label when the inputs are restricted to a small subspace. It is shown that Sherlock
is much more efficient in calculating output range than Reluplex. [20] also gives an
algorithm for output range analysis, and their algorithm is workable for all Lipschitz
continuous DNNs, including all layers and activation functions mentioned above. In
[24], the authors use symbolic interval propagation to calculate output range. Compared
with this work, our approach is sound and fits for general abstract domains, while their
symbolic interval propagation is unsound (see Sect. 5) and is designed specifically for
symbolic intervals.
[8] is the first to use abstract interpretation to verify DNNs. They define a class of
functions called conditional affine transformations (CAT) to characterize DNNs con-
taining fully connected, convolutional and max pooling layers with the ReLU activa-
tion function. They use Interval and Zonotope as the abstract domains and the powerset
technique on Zonotope. The performance of their tool AI2 is much more effective than
Reluplex. Compared with this work, we use symbolic propagation rather than power-
set extension techniques to enhance the precision of abstract interpretation based DNN
verification. Symbolic propagation is more lightweight than powerset extension. More-
over, we also use the bounds information given by abstract interpretation to accelerate
SMT based DNN verification.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we enhance the abstract interpretation based DNN verification approach
with a symbolic propagation technique. We show theoretically and experimentally that
this new technique can improve the bounds and speed up the verification procedure.
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